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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. L.ALLEN,
Pla-intiff,

vs.
LEWIS V. TRUEMAN, Judge of the
Second Judicial District of the State
of Utah; JOSEPH HOLBROOK,
Sheriff of Davis County, Utah;
CALVIN G. ROBERTS, Deputy
Sheriff of Davis County, State of
Utah; DAVID F. SMITH, Commissioner of Agriculture of the State of
Utah; and C. G. McCULLOCH,
Deputy Inspector of the Utah State
Commission of Agriculture,

Case No. 6194

Defendants.

Defendants' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the summer of 1939, and for many years prior
thereto, the Plaintiff, E. L. Allen, maintained, and at the
present time still maintains, what he denominates a "cream
station" on the east side of Highway No. 91 at the south
boundary of Davis County, Utah, immediately north of
Salt Lake City, Utah, where he engages in the business of
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selling milk and cream. The cream station is located in
a sparsely populated area and the Plaintiff operates no
routes to deliver his milk and cream, but relies entirely
upon the traffic passing his door for his customers.
Salt Lake City has enacted the United States public
health ordinance relative to milk,

Article V, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City,
1934
which ordinance prohibits the sale of fluid milk in Salt Lake
City, Utah, which is not produced, handled and sold in
accordance with the standards therein set forth. Any producer or distributor of milk complying with the standards
set forth in said ordinance is put to considerable expense
over and above the costs which normally accrue through
the production and distribution of milk. The milk and
cream sold by Plaintiff have not at any time been produced
according to the requirements of the Salt Lake City milk
ordinance.
The following dairies do business in Salt Lake City,
Utah, and the milk that they buy, process and distribute
complies in all respects with the milk ordinance of Salt Lake
City for Grade "A" milk. Each of the following named
dairies has a distinctive trade-mark, consisting of words,
design and color, which trade-mark is registered with the
Secretary of State of Utah, as provided by Title 95, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, and amendments thereto. These
trade-marks are permanently affixed to all of the refillable
glass milk containers used by these respective dairies, which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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8
said dairies, their trade names and trade-marks are as
follows:

Owne-r
Na·me
Arden ______________Midwestern Dairy
Products Co. ________________ Arden
Bountiful ____ _Bountiful Dairy ______________ Bountiful
Clover-Leaf
Clover Leaf Harris
Harris___________ Dairy ____________________________ Clover-Leaf
Harris
Clover Leaf _______ Clover Leaf Harris
Dairy -------------------------Clover Leaf
Fisher
Lester Fisher ________________ Fisher
Golden Glory __Salt Lake Milk Producers Ass'n ________________ Golden Glory
Green Meadow
Farm ______ Green Meadow Farm
Dairy ________________________ Green Meadow
Farm
Harris Jersey
Farm ___ _____E. F. Harris __________________ Harris Jersey
Farm
Hatch ______ c. M. Egan djbja Hatch
Farm Dairy _________________ Hatch
Mill Creek ___ John Rowell __________________ Mill Creek
Moss
Walter H. Moss _______________ Moss
Romney ____c. B. Stewart Romney ____ Romney
Royal ______ Royal Dairy Products
Company ______________________ Royal
Rosehill __________ E. Maddocks _______________ ___ Rosehill
Superior _____Superior Dairy Company _____________________________ Superior
Winder ______ George, J. R. and Edwin K. Winder djbja
Winder Dairy ______________ Winder
Hamilton Bros. ____ Hamilton Bros. Dairy ____ Hamilton Bros.
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The above dairies handle in excess of 907o of all milk
sold in Salt Lake City, Utah.
There are other dairies in Salt Lake having registered
trade-marks and said trade-marks are permanently attached
to the bottles in which they deliver their milk and cream.
For many years last past the dairies in Salt Lake have
maintained and opera ted a bottle exchange, to which all of
the dairies take any bottles gathered by their drivers, except their own trade-marked bottles. There the dairy is
given credit and there each dairy may withdraw all the
bottles received by the exchange which bears its registered
trade-mark, for which latter service a fee is charged, the
difference in the amount credited and charged being the
amount necessary to defray the cost of operating the exchange. The service of this exchange has been and now is
available to Plaintiff.
A milk bottle is worth approximately 8c and the dairies
in Salt Lake City annually purchase approximately $50,000.00 worth of bottles. This bottle cost is added to the price
that the public must pay for its milk. The largest part of
this cost is due to theft and wrongful abstraction of bottles
by junk men, second-hand dealers and to dairymen located
outside of Salt Lake, who have found that they can buy
trade-marked bottles of Salt Lake dairies for less than they
can buy new bottles from the glass companies.
In 1928, this Honorable Court told the dairy industry
in Salt Lake City, in the case of

Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, 269 P. 1020,
72 Utah 290, 60 A. L. R. 281,
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that it could not restrain another dairy from using its
trade-marked bottles because the industry had established
the practice of extracting a deposit for the bottle when the
milk was sold through stores, and that this gave the purchaser the right to use the bottle. Mr. Justice Thurman,
however, pointed out the remedy as follows:
"But, as already foreshadowed in what has been
said, plaintiffs have in their own hands just as complete a remedy for the injuries complained of as a
court of equity can afford them. They can commence
now to do what we have suggested they should have
done when they first put their trademarked bottles
in circulation. They can contract with their customers to return their trademarked bottles or be
responsible therefor. When they have once established that custom, their trademark will be of some
value. It will be prima facie evidence of ownership,
and the traffic in bottles bearing their trademarks
will either cease or be done at the peril of those who
engage in the traffic."
Since that time the industry has religiously followed
the advice of Justice Thurman and has an express or implied agreement with its customers that they will return
the trade-marked containers after the contents have been
used.
The only two exceptions within Salt Lake City and
environs to the system of distributing and recovering refillable glass milk containers are the Paramount Dairy,
which sells the container for 8c with the milk and agrees
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to repurchase the container when returned (to which system no one can take exception) and the Plaintiff in this
matter, who indiscriminately fills the trade-marked bottles
of others and extracts a deposit of 5c.
On the 26th of July, 1939, C. G. McCulloch, at the
behest of the milk industry in Salt Lake City, made an
affidavit before the Honorable Judge Lewis V. Trueman,
Judge of the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County,
Utah, alleging that on the 13th of July, 1939, he had gone
to the place o.f business of E. L. Allen. That at said time he
had found about 200 refillable glass milk containers being
used by plaintiff bearing the trade-marks and trade names of
other dairies in Salt Lake City, Utah. Also, said C. G. McCulloch alleges that on the 22nd day of June, 1938, a search and
seizure warrant had been directed to the place of business of
said E. L. Allen and approximately 800 refillable glass milk
containers bearing the trade-mark of other dairies had been
seized. Affiant further swore that he had been advised
by numerous persons who had purchased milk and cream
at said Allen cream station that in practically every instance
the milk and cream purchased had been contained in a
refillable glass milk container bearing the trade-mark and
trade name of a dairy located in Salt Lake City, Utah, other
than the trade-mark and name of said E. L. Allen.
Pursuant to said affidavit a search and seizure warrant was issued directing the Sheriff of Davis County to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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search the premises of said E. L. Allen and to ~eiZl' the
trade-marked and trade-named refillnble glass milk bottle~
of any of the following dairies. bearing any of tht~ following trade-marks :

Tmdi'-Ma rk

Owner

Arden

Midwestern Dairy Products Co.
Bountiful Dairy
Clover Leaf Harris Dairy _

Bountiful
CloYer-Leaf lh rris

Clover Leaf Harris Dairy
Clover Leaf
Lester Fisher ______________________________________ Fisher
Golden Glory

Salt Lake Milk Producers Ass'n __ .__

Green Meadow Farm Dairy _
Green Meadow Farm
E. F. Harris _______________________________________ .Harris Jersey Farm
C. M. Egan d,lb, a Hatch Farm Dairy
Mill Creek Dairy_ _______________

Hatch
_ __ Mill Creek

Walter H. Moss ________________ ----------------------------------C. B. Stewart Romney ______ ------------------------------ _

l\'loss
Romney

Royal Dairy Products Co.
E. Maddocks ____ ____ _ _____________________________ _

Rosehill

Superior Dairy Company ___________________________ _

Superior

George, J. R. and Edwin K. Winder,
djbja Winder Dairy ____________________

_ \Vinder

______________ _

Royal

Hamilton Bros. Dairy _______________________________ Hamilton Bros.
After said search and seizure warrant had been issued,
a search was made of the premises by Calvin G. Roberts,
deputy sheriff of Davis County, who thereupon seized the
following refillable glass milk containers :

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

Trade-Mark

Owner

~
......

<:r.l

;..;,

~
~
0

·~

~

~

Q.

~

·~

Arden ______________________ Midwestern Dairy
Products Co. _______________ _ 96 17
Bountiful _______________ Bountiful Dairy ____________ _ 23
2
Clover-Leaf Harris_ Clover Leaf Harris _________ _ 2
Clover Leaf ______________ Clover Leaf Harris
142 16
Fisher _____________________ Lester Fisher _______________ _ 4 1
Golden Glory _______ Salt Lake Milk
Producers Ass'n __
40 164
Hamilton Bros. _______ Hamilton Bros. Dairy
12 2
Harris Jersey
Farm ____________________ E. F. Harris _________ _
65 8
Hatch
__________________ c. M. Egan d/b/a
Hatch Farm Dairy _____ _ 12
1
Mill Creek __ __ _ ______ Mill Creek Dairy ___________ _ 5 2
Romney ____________________ C. B. Stewart Romney ___ _ 1
Moss _______________________ Walter H. Moss _______________ _ 13
4
Royal ________________________ Royal Dairy Products Co. 26
5
Rosehill ___________________ E. Maddocks
18 1
Superior __________________ Superior Dairy Co. ________ _ 12
1
'iVinder ___________________ George, J. R. and Edwin
K. Winder djbja Winder Dairy
14 2

1
4
3

2
3

1
1

-485 225 14
Upon the return of the search and seizure warrant being
made to the District Court, Defendant Lewis V. Trueman
issued a warrant of attachment directing said Calvin G.
Roberts to hold said property until further order of the
court. Immediately thereafter notice of the seizure of said
containers was served upon all of the owners of the trademarks listed above and in addition thereto notice was
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served upon Plaintiff E. L. Allen and one was posted in
his cream station, above referred to, each notice specifying
that any one claiming any interest in and to any of the
bottles should file a claim with the court on or before
August 19, 1939, at which time the court would hold a hearing to determine the parties entitled to the possession of
said refillable glass milk containers.
Thereafter, claims were duly filed by all of the dairies
above mentioned, claiming the refillable glass milk containers set forth in the return of the deputy sheriff, Calvin G.
Roberts. No claim was ever filed by E. L. Allen to the
effect that he was the owner of or entitled to the possession
of any of said refillable glass milk containers. Upon the
application of counsel for Allen the hearing on said matter
was continued from the 19th of August, 1939, and before
the same was heard the Defendants in the above entitled
matter were served with an alternative writ of prohibition,
on the ground, presumptively, that the Plaintiff did not
have any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
DISCUSSION OF THE FACTS
It becomes very apparent from the Defendants' statement of the case that it is similar only in general outline
with that set forth in Plaintiff's brief. Our judicial system
provides a method for resolving disputed questions of fact
and it seems to have been Plaintiff's desire, as evidenced
by his application for an alternative writ of prohibition, to
circumvent and avoid a determination of the facts in this
matter.
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The sole reason and purpose for Plaintiff's petition for
writ of prohibition is to test the constitutionality of Sections 95-2-10, Revised Statutes of Utah, as amended by
Chapter 110, Session Laws of Utah, 1939. Plaintiff is in
effect asking this Court, without the aid of any evidence of
any nature whatsoeve1·, to pass upon the reasonableness
of the classifications therein created, to determine certain
facts which must be determined before the applicability of
the sections may be determined.
According to Defendants' view point, Plaintiff's statement of the case is inaccurate. In the first place, in the
first paragraph and in the second paragraph he states in
effect that Plaintiff has acquired, by purchase and exchange
over the counter, various milk and cream bottles, and that
unless a bottle is presented by a purchaser a deposit is
required. The word "acquired" would assume that Plaintiff
has some interest in the bottles. A determination of this
question to a large extent determines the issues before the
court. The facts are ( 1) that a milk bottle costs about
8c; (2) that a milk bottle that has been used 10.0 times, so
long as it is not chipped or cracked, is just as valuable as
a new bottle and cannot be distinguished from a new bottle;
( 3) that Plaintiff has acquired such bottles as he may have
in his possession from junk men, second-hand dealers or by
exchange over the counter for bottles that were so acquired;
and ( 4) that the bottles so acquired by Plaintiff were acquired from people who had no title or right to the possession of said bottles.
In other words, for many years past it has been the
custom in Salt Lake City for a dairy to sell the milk or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cream contained in the bottle and as a service to deliver
the milk and cream in a refillable glass container, with an
implied agreement or understanding that the purcha~er may
use the bottle for the purpose of dispensing the milk or
cream therein contained, and that when the t'ontents of the
bottle have been dispensed the bottle will be returned to the
party from whom it was purchased or placed in such a place
that it may be repossessed by the owner of the bottle.
Plaintiff's assumption that the purchaser of the milk
contained in the glass bottle thereby acquires some interest
in the bottle is false and contrary to custom and common
sense. Neither the Plaintiff. nor any other dairy, can pay
8c for a bottle, pay the farmer 5c for milk to go in it, pasteurize and bottle the milk, put a cap on it and deliver it
to either a home or a store for 8-, 9- or lOc a quart. This
being true, we might pose the question, if the dairies do
not sell their bottles, how can Plaintiff acquire any interest
therein?
Bear in mind that $50,000.00 a year is involved in this
litigation. That is the price that the consumers of market
milk in Salt Lake City are now paying for the inability of
the dairies to reclaim their bottles and this amount is being
paid by the consumers and not by the dairies.
The second question is asked-how can Plaintiff sell
an 8c bottle for 5c and stay in business? The answer is that
Plaintiff does not pay 8c for his bottles because the Plaintiff acquired bottles belonging to the other dairies from
junk men and second-hand dealers, paying 2c or 3c for each
bottle. Plaintiff has a lucrative business, wherein he pay8
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2c or 3c for bottles belonging to other dairies and sells them
over the counter for 5c.
So it is respectfully submitted that the first question
to be determined in this law suit is whether or not Plaintiff,
by his mode of purchasing bottles, acquires any interest
whatsoever in and to the trade-marked bottles of other
dairies located in Salt Lake City, and it seems clear, according to the cases hereinafter cited, that he does not. There
is nothing in the statement of facts of Plaintiff's brief or
anywhere in his argument to show how a dairy located in
Salt Lake City, owning a bottle which is trade-marked and
can be readily identified, loses its title to the bottle.
A word as to the trade-mark phase of this case. The
answer of Defendants shows that pursuant to the search
and seizure warrant issued by Defendant, the Honorable
Lewis V. Trueman, trade-marked milk bottles belonging to
sixteen Salt Lake City dairies were seized and taken from the
place of business of Plaintiff. Plaintiff did not own these
bottles and had no interest whatsoever in and to the bottles
and Plaintiff knew who the owners of these bottles were
and knew that he had no right to the bottles. If evidence
were to be presented to this Court it would also show that
all sixteen of the dairies have Grade "A" permits, issued
by the Board of Health of Salt Lake City, and that all of
the milk distributed by said dairies to the citizens of Salt
Lake City in these bottles is Grade "A" milk; and would
show that the citizens of Salt Lake City, when they buy
milk in these trade-marked bottles, recognize that milk as
being Grade "A" milk, meeting the requirements of their
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tiff's place of business is located just north of the north
boundary of Salt Lake City and that he does not have a
Grade "A" permit issued by Salt Lake City and that he may
put in these trade-marked bottles any kind of milk he sees
fit. It may be high or it may be low in butterfat; it may
have high or low bacteria count, but there is no inspection
of the milk and what goes in the bottles is what Plaintiff
may from time to time determine. The evidence would
further show that most of the milk sold by Plaintiff is purchased by residents of Salt Lake City, who are acquainted
with the sixteen dairies above referred to and who know
that the sixteen dairies are holders of Grade "A" permits,
and who have come to rely upon the trade-marks of these
dairies as a guarantee of the fitness of the product contained
in the bottle for human consumption.
The evidence would further show that when one of these
trade-marked bottles is filled with milk by Plaintiff, the
only distinguishing character between the bottles so filled
and one filled by the owner of the trade-mark and owner
of the bottle, is the paper cap placed in the top of the bottle,
and that the milk buying public as such has come to rely
upon the trade-marks conspicuously blown into the glass
rather than upon the paper cap placed in the top of the bottle.
The third question may now be properly posed. If
Plaintiff may merchandise his milk in the trade-marked
containers of other dairies, why can not a small canning
company affix the labels of the Del Monte brand to its cans,
providing it acquires the labels from people who purchased
the original canned goods? Why can not the service station
dealer who has purchased a bulk oil tank from the Standard
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Oil Company refill it with an unnamed product and display
it at his place of business with its label of Standard Oil Company upon it? These examples could be multiplied a hundredfold.
On the top of page 3 in Plaintiff's statement of the
case he implies that some security should be demanded for
the return of the bottles. In other words, Plaintiff would
have Defendants place themselves in the same place they
were in 1928 when this Court said they were without relief
in

Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, supra.
Plaintiff, in his brief, argues the sufficiency of the
remedy provided by Chapter 16, Title 104, Revised Statutes
of Utah 1933. To recover personal property as provided
by this section it is necessary for the Plaintiff to make an
affidavit describing the property claimed. A moment's
reflection would show the inadequacy of this remedy.
A dairy, and in this respect Plaintiff is no exception,
receives during the course of the day a certain number of
empty bottles, which are washed and filled with milk and
sold and delivered in not to exceed 36 hours. Dealing, as
Plaintiff does, in the trade-marked bottles of all the dairies
of Salt Lake City, it immediately becomes apparent that
no dairy could possibly know from time to time how many,
if any, of its bottles were in the possession of Plaintiff. It
is also respectfully submitted that none of the dairies of
Salt Lake, their agents or employees, have the right of
access to Plaintiff's place of business, so there is no way
of determining from time to time how many, if any, bottles
belonging to each respective dairy are in Plaintiff's use.
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It further becomes apparent that if. by some means,
fair or foul. a dairy should learn thnt a given numb('r of
bottles was being used by Plaintiff, before it could go

through the mechanics of dictating and filing a complaint.
preparing an affidaYit and posting a bond, get the sheriff
to Plaintiffs' place of business. the Plaintiff may or may not
have in his possession any of the bottles which he had
possessed an hour or so preYiously.
And another fact that is very pertinent in this matter
is that a milk bottle is worth 8c. Of the 724 bottles seized
by the sheriff 1 bottle belonged to the Romney Dairy, while
164 containers belonged to the Clover Leaf Dairy. The question might be asked as to how much of a lawsuit a dairy
could maintain for one 8c milk bottle or for 164 milk bottles
worth $13.12. And yet it immediately becomes apparent
that the 724 milk bottles have a fair value of $57.92 and if
this is a fair example of the use to which Plaintiff puts the
bottles of other dairies, it could then be multiplied by 365,
which means Plaintiff uses $21,140.80 worth of bottles
per year that he has no right to. This indicates the damage
suffered by the dairies in Salt Lake by the conduct and
action of Plaintiff, and clearly entitles the dairies to some
adequate relief. Some relief which will permanently estop
Plaintiff from using and trafficking in the trade-marked
bottles of other dairies.
Plaintiff, in his brief, complains that no criminal complaint has been filed, as a result of the issuance and service
of the search and seizure warrant in question. Plaintiff,
however, does not complain about the continuances the court
has granted in two pending criminal cases. Until these are
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disposed of there is nothing to be gained by new complaints.
There seems to be a belief extant that a determination by
this court of the first question hereinafter set forth would
aid the court in disposing of the pending criminal cases.
QUESTIONS FOR DETERMINATION
There are two questions presented to the court in this
matter. First, has the Plaintiff any right in law to use the
trade-marked bottles of other dairies in the operation of
his cream station? Second, is the procedure provided by
Title 95, Chapter 2, Revised Statutes of Utah, as amended
by Chapter 110, Laws of Utah, 1939, a constitutional procedure to recover trade-marked bottles and to revest the
owners thereof with possession?
ARGUMENT
THE OvVNER OF A TRADE-MARKED BOTTLE DOES
NOT LOSE TITLE TO THE SAME WHEN IT IS
DELIVERED TO A PURCHASER OF THE MILK
CONTAINED THEREIN.
Although this proposition is not directly announced in

Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, supra
it is respectfully submitted that the opinion therein indicates
such to be the fact. This court also had an opportunity
of passing upon this particular question in the case of

Allen v. Lindbeck, 93 P. (2d) 920 (Utah).
but saw fit to leave it unanswered.
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The pertinent part of the statute, 95-2-11, amended
by Chapter 110 as above stated, reads as follows:
"95-2-11. Transfer of Ownership to Be in Writing.
(1) The ownership of or right to use any such name,
mark, brand. or device may be transferred only by
an instrument in writing, duly acknowledged by the
vendor, and filed in the office of the secretary of
state. Until such instrument shall have been filed
as aforesaid the ownership in and right to the use
of such name. mark, brand or device shall be deemed
not to have passed and any intended transfer shall
be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid or
effective for any purpose.
"(2) No property rights whatsoever or interest
or right of possession or use in or to any receptacle,
container, carrier, box, equipment or supplies, bearing or having stamped, impressed or produced thereon, any name, mark, brand or device, claim to which
has been filed and published as aforesaid, shall be
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law or by bill of sale
or other conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party granting, assigning or surrendering the same
or by his la"\\rful agent thereunto authorized by writing."
If this section means what it says, and there is nothing

in Plaintiff's brief to indicate to the contrary, then in view
of the fact that no deposit for any of these bottles has ever
been taken, as condemned in the

Clover Leaf Dairy v. Van Gerven, supra
case, then there is no reason and no argument that the
ownership of these bottles or any property rights in them
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whatsoever has ever left the owner of the registered trademark appearing on the bottles.
In the absence of any statute whatsoever, the practice
of refilling trade-marked containers has been condemned.
The rule is well stated in
60 A. L. R. 285
as follows:

"It may be stated as a general rule, without apparent dissent, that the use of a rival's bottle, tank, or
other container for the sale of a competing product,
where the purpose and effect of such use are to enable the producer or retailer to pass off the user's
product as the product of the manufacturer originally using the container, is unfair competition,
warranting the issuance of an injunction to prevent
such use."
The following cases support this proposition:

Evans v. Von Laer (1887; C. C.) 32 F. 153
Sawyer Crystal Blue Co. v. Hubbard (1887;
C. C.) 32 F 388
Hostetter Co. v. Brueggeman-Reinert Distilling
Co. P891; C. C.) 46 F. 188
Pontefact v. Isenberger (1900; C. C.) 106 F. 499
Hostetter Co. v. William Schneider fVholesale
W1:ne & Liquor Co. (1900 C. C.) 107 F. 705
(dismissed on motion of appellant in (1901)
49 C. C. A. 673, 110 F. 1007)
Hostetter Co. v. Marl'inoni (1901; C. C.) 110
F. 524
Van Hoboken v. Mohns & Kaltenbach (1901;
C. C.) 112 F. 528
Hostetter Co. v. Gallagher Stores (1905; C. C.)
142 F. 208
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Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Post & L. Co. (1908; C. C.)
163 F. 63
Moxie Co. v. Bagoian (1912; D. C.) 197 F. 680
(affirmed in (1913) 124 C. C. A. 319, 206
F. 437)
Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Bogn1 (1910 C. C.) 209 F.
915
Prest-O-Lite Co. v. Da l'is ( 1913; D. C.) 209 F.
917 (affirmed in ( 1914) 131 C. C. A. 491,
215 F. 349)
Hennessy v. Trine Growers' .-lsso. (1914; D. C.)
212 F. 308
Trade-mark statutes, wherein trade-marked refillable
glass milk containers are involved, have been sustained by
the Kansas court in

Wichita v. Fletcher. 56 P. (2d) 106
and

Wichita National Milk Dealers v. Capp, 59 P.
(2d) 29,

while the California court has upheld its bottle law in

8 P. (2d) 140
and the Colorado court has upheld its bottle law in

Denver Milk Bottle Case v. McKinzie, 287 P. 868
The foregoing cases clearly demonstrate the proposition that the Plaintiff had no right in law to the possession
of the milk bottles seized by the Sheriff of Davis County;
he had no title to them and he had no right to use them.
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THE PROCEDURE PROVIDED BY TITLE 95, CHAPTER
2, REVISED STATUTES OF UTAH,

1933, AS

AMENDED BY CHAPTER 110, LAWS OF UTAH
1939, IS A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURE.
We then come to the second proposition, to wit: Is the
procedure provided by Title 95, Chapter 2, Revised Statutes
of Utah, as amended by said Chapter 110, a constitutional
procedure to recover trade-marked bottles and to revest the
owners thereof with possession? In other words, Plaintiff,
having no right, title or interest in or to the milk bottles
found in his possession and used by him, as disclosed by the
record in this case, and it being apparent from what has
been said heretofore, that there exists no adequate remedy
in law by which the owners of the bottles may regain possession thereof, and the legislature having, by Section 95-2-10,
as amended by said Chapter 110, set forth a procedure
which will allow the owners of trade-marked bottles to repossess them, there remains but one question, that is,
whether or not this Court finds the procedure therein set
forth so repulsive to the constitution of this state that it
can be fairly said that the legislature, by providing the
procedure therein set forth, exceeded the authority vested
in it by law.
This Court has announced, in the case of
Lehi City v. Meiling, 48 P. (2d) 535,
the presumption which attends all legislative enactments in
the following language :
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"In approaching the subject we have in mind the
rule that when an act of the Legislature is attacked
on grounds of unconstitutionality the question presented is not whether it is possible to condemn the
act, but whether it is possible to uphold it. The presumption is always in favor of the validity, and
legislative enactments must be sustained unless clearly in violation of fundamental law. Wadsworth v.
Santaquin City, 83 Utah 321, 28 P. (2d) 161. Every
presumption will be indulged in favor of legislation
and only clear and demonstrable usurpation of power
will authorize judicial interference with legislative
action. Green v. Frazier, 253 U. S. 233, 40 S. Ct.
499, 64 L. Ed. 878. It is a truism recognized by all
the authorities that the Legislature of a state is
vested with the whole of the legislative power of the
state and may deal in any subject within the scope
of constitutional government except as such power
is limited or directed by express provision of the
Constitution or necessary implication arising therefrom. 'State Constitutions are mere limitations, and
not grants, of powers.' Salt Lake City v. Christensen
Co., 34 Utah 38, 95 P. 523, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 898.
"The presumption which attends every act of the
Legislature is that it is within its power, and any
one who would attack the legality of a legislative act
must point to the particular provision of the organic
act which he claims excludes such power from legislative competence or demonstrate that is clearly
excluded by necessary implications arising from constitutional provisions. It is one of the objects of
government to promote the public welfare of the
state and provide for the material prosperity of its
people. It is for the Legislature to determine the
manner and extent to which it will exercise this
function of government, and its determination upon
that point is limited by its own discretion, and is
beyond the interference of the courts. In re Madera
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Irr. District, 92 Cal. 296, 28 P. 272, 675, 14 L. R. A.
755, ""27 Am. St. Rep. 106."
An analysis of said Section 95-2-10, as amended by said
Chapter 110, indicates that the first paragraph provides
for a method of issuing a search and seizure warrant. The
second paragraph tells to whom it shall be issued. The
third and fourth paragraphs tell how the warrant shall be
executed. The fifth tells what shall be done after the taking
of the property, the sixth sets forth a procedure to be
followed by the court to determine the right to possession
of property and the seventh paragraph tells the kind of an
order the court shall enter, depending on its findings.
Plaintiff charges this paragraph with being unconstitutional and violating a number of sections of our state
and federal constitutions.
It might be well to briefly check this section with Chapter 54 of Title 105, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1933. In the
first place, Section 105-54-3 says that search warrants shall
be issued only upon the findings of probable cause supported
by oath or affirmation. The weakness of the former law
in this respect, as pointed out in the case of

Allen v. Lindbeck, supra
has been corrected in the present enactment and is not
questioned by Plaintiff.
In the second place, under Section 105-54-2 a search
warrant may be issued when the property is stolen or embezzled. Also, when said property is in the possession of
any person with intent to use as a means of committing a
public offense. Both of these grounds seem to be satisfied
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in the case in which the warrant was issued in the case at
bar, as well as in the cases contemplated by Title 95 as
amended. In other words, Allen does not own these bottles
or have a right to possession or have a right to use them.
His possession of them and filling them with milk consti-

tutes a public offense.
It will be noted that as to the time of serving the warrant, Chapter 54 is broader than Chapter 2 of Title 95, in
that warrants issued under Chapter 110, Laws of Utah
1939, may be served only in the daytime, while search and
seizure warrants issued under 105-54-1 may be served at
night under certain specified conditions. It is to be noted
that the duties of the peace officer in regard to the return
to be made to the court is substantially the same in both
enactments as well as the proviso as to giving of receipts.
Chapter 55 of Title 105 provides the method by which the
magistrate shall dispose of property coming into his possession as the result of the execution of search and seizure
warrant. It is to be submitted that the procedure outlined
in 95-2-10, as amended by said Chapter 110, is more specific,
more likely to insure justice than the procedure outlined in
Chapter 55.

In one of the cases cited by Plaintiff, that is,
People v. Kempner, 101 N. E. (N. Y. 1913) 794,

which is cited as an authority for the proposition that a
search warrant is an improper method of trying title to
property seized, the court therein predicates its holding in
the following language :
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"There is nothing in any of the provisions of the
code of criminal procedure that authorizes a trial
of the title to or possession of the property taken
under the warrant."
In another case cited by Plaintiff the court objected
to the act in the following language at page 875:

* * and when such property is brought before the court the act makes no provision for its
disposition."

"*

Lippman v. People, 51 N. E. 872 (Ill. 1898)

It is respectfully submitted that not only would the
Kempner and Lippman cases have been decided differently
had a provision similar to said Chapter 55, Title 105, been
involved, but it would have been decided differently in view
of the procedure specified in 95-2-10, Revised Statutes of
Utah 1933, as amended by Chapter 110, Laws of Utah 1939.
In other words, it seems to follow as a matter of law
that if Plaintiff Allen is not entitled to use the bottles that
were taken from him by the Sheriff of Davis County, and
he has no title or right to possession thereof or any right to
use them, then they could be taken from him by Chapter 54
of Title 105, Laws of Utah 1933, and recovered by the true
owner by the procedure set forth in Chapter 55 of said title.
Any changes or differences that appear between the two
sections just noted and the provisions of Section 95-2-10
and said Chapter 110 are mostly differences in detail.
Plaintiff, in his brief, cited certain authorities to the
effect that the issuance of a search and seizure warrant to
recover stolen milk bottles from a person who possesses them
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without any right, under such circumstances that they nre
effectively concealed, and for which there is no other ndequate remedy at law, is an illegal search and seizure. In
People v. 1\.empner. supra.

which Plaintiff cites as an authority for this proposition, the
court said of the search and seizure warrant :
"But their legality has long been considered to be
established on the ground of public necessity, because
without them felons and other malfactors would
escape detection."
which quotation seems to fit the problem before this court.
Another case cited by Plaintiff,
Briggs v. Shepard Jfanufacturing Co., 105 N. E.
622 (Mass. 1914),

contains an interesting statement by Judge Hammond relative to the purposes to be served by a search warrant at
common law.
"At common law, upon the return of a search warrant for personal property alleged to have been
stolen, the magistrate upon the return of the warrant
was to proceed as follows: If it appeared that the
goods brought before him had not been stolen they
were to be returned to the person in whose possession they were found; if it appeared that they were
stolen, they were not to be delivered to the owner
but to be deposited in the hands of the officer who
executed the warrant, to the end that the party
from whom they were stolen might proceed to complain of the offender, and upon conviction of him
might have restitution of them."
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On the basis of Judge Hammond's statement it would
appear that the procedure here complained of by Plaintiff is
very little more than a codification of the common law.
A most recent case from the California court,

Pacific Coast Dairy v. Police Court, 8 P. (2d)
140, 80 A. L. R. 1217
reviews the principal cases cited by Plaintiff, wherein the
court had to pass on the following section of the act.
"It shall be the duty of every person who finds or
receives in the regular course of business or in any
other manner any container marked with a brand
registered under the provisions of this section to
make diligent effort to find the owner thereof and to
restore or return the same."

Plaintiff contended the section was unconstitutional and relied on the following cases:

Horwich v. Walker-Gordon Lab. Co., 205 Ill. 497,
68 N. E. 938, 98 Am. St. Rep. 254
State v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. W. 945,
Ann. Cas. 1915A, 477.
Yaeger v. State, 78 Fla. 354, 83 S. 525
State v. Schmuck, 77 Ohio 438, 83 N. E. 797,
14 L. R. A. (NS) 1128, 122 Am. St. Rep. 527
State v. TViggam, 187 Ind. 159, 118 N. E. 684
As to these cases, the court said :
"These cases were considered at length in Bartolloti
v. Police Court, 35 Cal. App. 372, 170 P. 161,
where the District Court of Appeal, having under
consideration the California Container Act of 1911
(St. 1911, p. 416), rejected the authorities cited as
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not applicable under the California Constitution, and
cited with approval as an opposing line of authorities
on similar statutes People v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32,
34 N. E. 759, 36 Am. St. Rep. 668; Commonwealth v.
Anselvich, 186 Mass. 376, 71 N. E. 790, 104 Am. St.
Rep. 590; and Commonwealth v. Goldburg, 167 Ky.
96, 180 S. W. 68. To the cases last cited Renner
Brewing Co. v. Rolland, 96 Ohio St. 432, 118 N. E.
118, may be added, a case which involved an amendment of the statute considered in the earlier Ohio
case of State v. Schmuck, supra, and which should
now be taken as stating the Ohio rule. The opinion
in the Bartolloti Case is the last expression of the
appellate courts of this state upon the constitutionality of statutes relating to the use of containers
generally, and it must be treated as rejecting the
rule of the cases here cited by the appellant and as
accepting the more liberal and general rule announced in People v. Cannon, supra, and in the other
cases heretofore cited.
"On principle, the General Dairy Law is manifestly a constitutional enactment, as it is designed
to protect the traffic in milk and cream."
The New York court, in 1930, in the case of
People v. Ryan, (1930) 230 App. Div. 252, 243
N.Y. S. 644

l!eld that a statute which provided that no person should
use any milk bottle having the name or initials of the owner
stamped, marked, or fastened on such bottle, without the
consent of the owner, was not unconstitutional, saying:
"We fail to see how it can be said that this provision deprives anyone of his property without due
process of law, or that it is discriminatory, arbitrary,
or unreasonable."
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It was also said that the statute was not beyond the police
power of the state, as it tended to prevent fraud being
practiced on the public, and served to promote the health,
safety, and welfare of the community.
CONCERNING THE USE OF THE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE WARRANT
Plaintiff has objected to the propriety of using a search
and seizure warrant in the recovery of milk bottles. It is
respectfully submitted that there are no cases cited by
Plaintiff holding that a search warrant may not be so used.
Plaintiff relies upon the historical background of the search
and seizure warrant and in effect says that because search
and seizure warrants have never been used to recover possession of milk bottles, therefore, the legislature has no
power to allow them to be so used now.
This brings us to a consideration of the comparative
powers and duties of the three departments of the American
democratic government, as established by our state and
federal constitutions. This being a subject which has been
thoroughly explored in our newspapers and periodicals, and
by speakers as well as by our courts and legislative bodies,
during the past few years, any discussion which might
be inserted herein would add little. Suffice to quote from
an article appearing in the February issue of the Harvard
Law Review, entitled "Some Aspects of American Constitutional Law," by Thomas Reed Powell, Professor of Constitutional Law at Harvard.

Harvard Law Review, Vol. LIII, Page 529-530
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"\Vith such apologies to the dictionary as may
be its due, 'Aspects' must here do service in at least
a double aspect. It includes segments and phases,
and it includes approaches and points of view,-the
thing looked at and the standpoint and attitude of
the looker. The moon changes its aspect in its
recurring phases, and any momentary phase may
mean to the astronomer or the navigator something
quite different from what it means to the song writer
or the lover. Constitutional law somewhat resembles
the moon, but with a significant difference. Neither
the navigator nor the lover has any effect on the
moon. Those who look officially at the Constitution
may to an extent create it in their own image. When
Taney took a different approach to the Constitution
from that of Marshall, the Constitution became different from what it was before. Thus the different
aspects of the aspects of Constitutional Law may
become fused as they are often confused. Even the
unofficial looker at the Constitution may see only
the reflection of his own lenses. Among the unofficial lookers, some are lawyers, some are not.
Among the official lookers, some lawyers look different and differently from others.
"Even the casual reader of the newspapers is
now aware that in recent years the Constitution has
been rapidly changing its face. This way of putting
it may seem to imply that the Constitution can itself
administer the lipstick and the mascara and the
wrinkle-remover. This, again, would be to confuse
the two aspects of 'aspects.' For its face lifting the
Constitution goes to a beauty parlor in which there
are nine more or less co-operative beauticians, all
lawyers, some former professors, some not. Of these
nine lawyers, some have been more co-operative than
others. For the past two terms, the two Supreme
Court Justices longest in continuous service have
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been the ones most often unable to see the Constitution that their majority colleagues pointed out to
them, though they must have been aware that for
the moment at least the majority made the Constitution look the way they looked at it. The four Juniors
on the panel could not have done this by themselves.
They needed the help of at least one other, and often
got the help of three, one of whom at least was no
sudden convert.
"For the unofficial observer, the important contemporary fact is that the Constitution is in a process
of change and that for a season the change is likely
to push further and further. How far it will go or
how long it will continue, no one can positively know.
The Constitution has often followed an undulating
course hitherto. Not a little of the recent change
is a return to conceptions and attitudes previously
dominant. In the first judicial interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Mr. Justice Miller for the
majority saw nothing to a contention that the grant
of a monopoly of butchering could deny due process
to those compelled to sheathe their knives, and he
doubted whether the equal protection clause had any
application to others than those recently emancipated
from slavery. When governmental fixing of maximum prices was first considered, it was declared that,
when the power obtains, the limit of its exercise is
to be set by the legislature and not by the courts.
The later opposite attitudes were innovations before
they became commonplaces. The erosion now in
process may or may not take us back to the original
boundaries. It can hardly take us beyond them."
To say that the milk marketing industry, by reason
of the dependence of the American public on its services,
has not progressed beyond the status of a purely private
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industry is to refuse to recognize indisputable facts. For
many years certain service industries have been labelkd
"public utilities." And under this label they have been
regulated and in turn have exercised privileges and prerogatives not extended to purely private enterprises. Perhaps
the label "public utility" is not truly or justly applicable
to the milk industry, but by the same token the milk industry is so regulated, and the demands of the public upon
it are so great, that it must be considered in its true light
and not penalized through formal classification.
So the question is, is the interest of the public in the
market milk industry such that the legislature is justified
in establishing a procedure which will allow the industry
to recover its refillable glass milk containers? And it is
respectfully submitted, in view of the foregoing, that the
answer to this question should be in the affirmative.
The alternative writ of prohibition should be dismissed
and Defendant Trueman instructed to proceed with the
hearing, as provided by Chapter 2, Title 95, Revised Statutes
of Utah 1933, as amended by Chapter 110, Laws of Utah
1939.
Respectfully submitted,
FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFFAT & MABEY,

Attorneys for Defendants.
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